



## CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Extension, refurbishment & sub-division of the existing Homebase store to provide a downsized unit for Homebase & a new Class A1 retail unit to be occupied by Lidl. Relocation of the Homebase garden centre, the reconfiguration of the existing car park & associated landscaping, & the creation of a new egress from the site.

at Unit 1 Altrincham Retail Park George Richards Way Altrincham

FOR: Lidl UK/Orchard Street Investment Management LLP

Greater Manchester Police

VERSION A: 09.10.19

designforsecurity

2019/0651/CIS/01

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## Unit 1, Altrincham Retail Park, Broadheath, Altrincham


### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

#### Development supported

We are happy to support the development subject to suitably addressing the recommendations that are set out in section 3.3 of this report and following the physical security specification set out in section 4. The principal recommendations include:

- The appointment of a security guard
- Ensuring the Homebase service area is appropriately secured
- Installing security rated entrance and escape doors, glazing and shutters
- Securing the staff welfare area and management offices
- Installing appropriate lighting, CCTV and intruder alarm systems
- Providing secure, customer, cycle parking
- Including bollards to protect the Lidl store entrance.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will support the application and request that conditions be included requiring any outstanding security issues are appropriately addressed and requiring the development to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.



**Adrian Murphy MRTPI**

Consultant

[adrian.murphy@designforsecurity.org](mailto:adrian.murphy@designforsecurity.org)

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# 1 Visual Audit

The photographs and plan below show the development site and its surroundings. The site, edged in red on the plan, is located on the Altrincham Retail Park, on the north side of George Richards Way in Broadheath, Altrincham. The retail park comprises a series of large non-food retail units and a drive-through restaurant. There is a very large car park, in front of retail units and servicing to the rear. The site that is subject to this application extends to around 1.8 hectares, is located on the eastern fringe of the retail park and a Homebase DIY store trades from it. As well as a substantial retail unit, there is an associated 'open air' garden centre on the western side of the building and a gated service yard, which is situated to the rear of the garden centre. Most of the rear elevation of the store adjoins Huxley Street, a short cul-de-sac that includes residential and commercial uses. Access to the service yard is gained from Craven Road to the west of the retail park via an elongated service road that navigates around the rear elevations of all of the units. The service road is secured with substantial gates and paladin fencing; the Homebase service yard is additionally secured with very tall, timber gates supplemented with razor wire. Similarly, tall, timber fencing and razor wire, and dense shrubbery define the northern boundary of the service yard at Huxley Street. Customers driving to the retail park gain access to the car park from a light controlled junction on George Richards Way. There are also pedestrian links into the site at several points on George Richards Way and from Manchester Road, to the east, and Huxley Street, to the north.



The southern elevation of the Homebase store and garden centre facing the customer car park



Approaching the timber gates, which secure the Homebase service yard



Looking north towards the Homebase garden centre



The substantial car park in front of the Homebase store



The gated entrance to the service road at the western edge of the retail park



Tall, timber fencing with barbed wire & dense shrubbery define the northern boundary of the Homebase service yard

There have been 284 crimes reported in the neighbourhood around the site in the past 12 months. There is a particular concentration of crime on the Altrincham Retail Park with theft, criminal damage, theft of bicycles, and crimes involving the use or threat of violence, among the most common. There are several commercial premises in the neighbourhood that attract criminals including a number on the retail park, a nearby food supermarket and a petrol filling station. Around a third of all crimes in this neighbourhood relate to commercial premises, mainly retail and restaurant uses. More than half of all crimes in this area involve the use or threat of violence. Crimes recorded at retail premises in the area analysed tend to relate to burglary, theft and assault. When looking at the immediate environment of, and around, the site, the nature of the crimes committed locally and the modus operandi of offenders who target retail premises, the principal risks are likely to be: criminal damage - the quality of construction of the buildings' shell (doors, windows, glass and shutters), the boundary treatments used to limit access to the rear of the development, and the layout of the car park and pedestrian routes through it; burglary - the accessibility all elevations of the store where there are doors or windows as well as the service yard; robbery and shoplifting - the deployment and quality of security products used within the store; and, car and cycle theft - the inclusion of well laid out car and cycle parking, self-policed by staff and the users of the site as well as monitoring by management staff using the retail park CCTV system.

## 2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 and 30th June 2019.

### 2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
14	8	31	132	23	<5	5	9	5	8

2.1.1 The volume of crime recorded in this neighbourhood is around the average when compared to other neighbourhoods within Trafford. As well as crimes involving the use or threat of violence, the most prominent issue is criminal damage. Reports of criminal damage are spread across the neighbourhood but there is a slight concentration in the immediate vicinity of the site. Crimes involving the use or threat of violence have taken place around the retail park and in the residential area to the north-west of the site. Theft is concentrated on Manchester Road, where fuel is the principal item stolen.

### 2.1 Modus operandi used in committing burglary and theft at retail premises across Trafford & measures to reduce risk

#### 2.1.1 Shutters were forced open

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing shutters:

- shutters, whether solid or perforated, should be certified to LPS 1175 sr1 or sr2; and,
- high fencing should be used to secure vulnerable, secluded elevations of the building where shuttered openings may be located.

#### 2.1.2 Doors have been forced open and glazed panels within them have been smashed to gain entry

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing the doors or smashing glazed panels:

- entrance and service doors should be certified to PAS 24 or LPS 1175;
- glazed doors, and windows, on side and rear elevations should be avoided;
- glazing to any other doors and to the shop display windows should include laminate rather than toughened glazing;
- the customer entrance door should be visible to neighbouring properties and from the 'street' rather than set within a recess or on more secluded elevations;
- external service areas should be enclosed with appropriately high fencing and locking gates;
- secluded public passageways to the sides and rear of premises should be avoided wherever possible as such routes can facilitate secluded access to service yards, as well as attract anti-social behaviour; and,
- all external doors should be illuminated by dusk-to-dawn lights.

#### 2.1.3 Offenders posing as legitimate customers in order to steal goods or gain access to staff-only areas and steal property

To minimise the risk of offenders stealing from premises:

- use overt CCTV to allow staff to monitor customer behaviour and include signs to warn customers that CCTV is in operation;
- create a secure 'back of house' to the unit, with fob or keypad controlled doors;
- locate customer entrance doors and 'back of house' doors in areas where staff can easily monitor movements in and out (back of house doors are best located adjacent to or behind service counters; and,


## 2.2 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:


- Burglary
- Robbery
- Shoplifting
- Theft by employees
- Theft of customer/staff property
- Criminal damage to property & vehicles
- Theft of, and from, vehicles
- Bicycle theft
- Anti-social behaviour
- Theft of plant and machinery, and criminal damage during the construction period.

## 2.3 Burglary at retail premises: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary at retail premises recorded in Trafford



2.3.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary is greatest on a Sunday and during the late evening.





2.3.2 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary in the Trafford area peaks on a Sunday during the late evening (8pm – 11pm). Offenders target retail premises on a Sunday as the opening hours are shorter and employees are less likely to be present. During the late evening it is dark and there is less foot fall in the area, giving offenders the perception that there is less of a risk of being caught or identified.

2.3.3 **Point of Entry:** The most common means of breaking and entering at retail premises in Trafford were as follows:

- Front and rear doors were forced open using bodily pressure or tools - often jemmies or metal bars.
- Shutters protecting doors and windows were forced upwards.
- Glazed panels in windows and front doors were smashed
- Offenders have posed as legitimate customers to access premises when they are open before targeting insecure doors of stockrooms or offices or tailgating staff into restricted areas
- Using hand tools to remove plasterboard on internal walls in order to gain access to private areas.
- Climbing onto the roof of a building and removing roof tiles in order to gain entry.

## 2.4 Theft Retail: Risk Analysis



*The data below relates to thefts within/against retail, recorded in the Trafford area.*



2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of theft is greatest on Wednesday and in the afternoon. Offenders often target retail premises in the afternoon when they are at their busiest. Offenders targeted customers and employees belongings, stealing mobile phones, bank cards and handbags.

## 2.5 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

*The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.*



2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is low but rises on a Wednesday and Thursday, and during the late morning and into the afternoon before rising again later in the evening.

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## 3 Layout Appraisal

### 3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development involves: remodelling the existing Homebase store, including relocation of the garden centre to the car park on the eastern side unit; the erection of a Lidl food store on the site of the existing garden centre; construction of an egress from the site onto George Richards Way; a new pedestrian access from George Richards Way and widened pedestrian access onto Manchester Road; and, the reconfiguration of the existing car park.
- 3.1.2 The Lidl store will have a largely, rectangular footprint and a gross internal area of 1,858m<sup>2</sup> and a net retail sales area of 1,272m<sup>2</sup>. The building will be single-storey, with customer entrance and exit doors at the south-eastern corner, and a service yard to the rear (northern side). The store will have a glazed southern and part of the western elevation; otherwise the building is finished with a blockwork. In terms of external doors, there are automated, sliding customer entrance and exit doors on the front elevation and several escape doors and service door on the rear elevation. Externally, the trolley store will be located within the car park close to the store entrance; a plant enclosure will be located at the rear of the store next to the service doors. The timber gates securing the existing Homebase service yard will be relocated to enclose the reduced service yard serving Homebase only.
- 3.1.3 The Homebase garden centre will be relocated to the car park at the eastern end of the Homebase store and will be largely open to the elements except for an area under a proposed canopy. The garden centre will be secured with similarly high fencing and blockwork pillars with glazed panels to that which currently encloses the garden centre. There will be a combined customer and delivery entrance doors on the 'elevation' facing the car park, and escape doors/gates within the side and rear boundaries.
- 3.1.4 The Homebase store itself will be reduce in area but the customer entrance will remain unaltered. A new service door and an additional escape door will be introduced into the rear (service yard) elevation.
- 3.1.5 Vehicle access into the site will continue to be taken from George Richards Way but to ease congestion at the exit to the retail park; a second egress will be created in front of the store allowing direct access onto George Richards Way, by-passing the current light controlled exit. The car park will be remodelled resulting in a reduction of 94 spaces leaving a total of 696 spaces.
- 3.1.6 A cycle store for customers' bikes will be provided centrally, in front of the remodelled Homebase store.

### 3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

- 3.2.1 The growing number of premises at the Retail Park site will generate activity and supervision of the site throughout the day and into the evening.
- 3.2.2 The Lidl store will have a relatively simple, rectangular, footprint, which will facilitate natural and electronic surveillance of the external areas.
- 3.2.3 The glazed southern elevation and partial glazing of the western elevation of the proposed Lidl store facilitates supervision of parts of the car park and the cycle parking by staff and customers within the store.
- 3.2.4 The Lidl store customer entrance is located in a very visible position on the front elevation.
- 3.2.5 The Lidl entrance format, with separate, automated, doors at the customer entrance and exit, as well as the store layout (requiring customers to pass through a till point) enhances the security of the store, deterring shoplifters and those intent of committing robbery.
- 3.2.6 Back of house areas can easily be made secure with the installation of appropriate controls on doors connecting both the warehouse and the staff welfare area to the shop floor.
- 3.2.7 The car park is readily visible from all of the store entrances and pedestrian circulation pathways.
- 3.2.8 Well-located cycle parking is provided on the site. It will be in a place where there will be regular activity and supervision related to customers coming and going from Lidl and Homebase.
- 3.2.9 The service yards are appropriately secure although the timber fencing is not ideal.
- 3.2.10 The site benefits from a management regime, which addresses site security and maintenance issues.



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## 3.3 Recommendations to Improve the Security of the Development

### Traffic calming

- 3.3.1 Given the highway layout at the approach to the car park, the layout of the car park itself, and likely mix of pedestrians - often pushing shopping trolleys, and vehicles, measures should be installed that will calm traffic speeds and direct pedestrians to safe routes across the car park. Poor behaviour by both motorists and pedestrians within a busy retail centre car parks can sometimes lead to conflict. Designing the car park so that traffic speeds are moderated – using rumble strips or raised thresholds - and safe, convenient routes are included to cater for pedestrians and cyclists – using shared surfaces, different surfacing to denote pedestrian routes - will reduce the risk of disputes arising.

### Signage

- 3.3.2 Signs should be placed strategically throughout the development. Signs should: inform the public of the name of the development; direct customers to the various businesses on the site; deter customers from entering restricted areas; identify pedestrian routes; inform customers of the use of CCTV on the site; and, clearly state the regulations for use of the car park (and sanctions for misuse).

### Landscaping

- 3.3.3 High quality, well maintained landscaping within the site will help improve the appearance of the development, define the edges of the site, prevent parking in inappropriate places and protect boundary fencing from irregular vehicle movements. Tree and shrub planting should respect the need to maintain lines of sight across the development by staff and customers as well as by CCTV cameras.
- 3.3.4 Bollards preventing access onto the Lidl store entrance forecourt should be set in concrete foundations and robust enough to withstand accidental damage by careless motorists as well as hostile attacks by criminals.

### Security Guard

- 3.3.5 Lidl should consider employing a security guard, visible on the shop floor, during shopping hours.

### Service areas

- 3.3.6 Because the service area is secluded, the timber fencing has been breached in the past, and the rear elevation includes a service and escape doors, places an offender may target in attempts at breaking and entering or targeting staff leaving the premises in advance of a robbery, I recommend that the service area should be enclosed with 3000mm high, welded-wire mesh fencing and gates to make it more difficult for offenders to enter the service area and target staff or the building. This additional layer of security will also reduce the risk of the loading area attracting anti-social behaviour, criminal damage or of an arson attack on the refuse store.
- 3.3.7 Armco™ barriers should be installed around the periphery of the service areas to protect perimeter fencing and the buildings.

### The building

- 3.3.8 All external doors, glazing and the service shutter should carry a security certification.
- 3.3.9 In order to prevent breaking and entering, and criminal damage, security rated shutters or grilles should be fitted to any windows to staff rooms, and to the customer entrance and exit doors.
- 3.3.10 Doors connecting the shop floor to the staff welfare areas and the door to the management office in the Lidl store should be security rated. Both doors should be self-closing and lock securely upon closure.
- 3.3.11 If there is a window in the management office that allows a 'one-way' view across the till areas, laminate glass should be fitted.
- 3.3.12 An access control system should be installed in each unit, one that controls entry to the warehouse from the shop floor and from the shop floor to the staff welfare areas. A fob activated system is preferred.
- 3.3.13 A secure refuse store should be provided at the rear of the Lidl store.

### Cash handling

- 3.3.14 A safe which meets the LPS 1163 standard should be installed in the management offices.
- 3.3.15 Chute deposit safes should be considered for use at till points.

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- 3.3.16 A dedicated parking bay should be marked out very close to the store entrances for the use of cash in transit or emergency service vehicles only.

#### **CCTV in store and around site**

- 3.3.17 A CCTV system should be installed at the Lidl store with cameras capable of monitoring activity within the store, the store entrance and exit doors, the warehouse and back of house, the service area, and all elevations of the building. Monitoring equipment should be located within the management office whilst recording equipment should be located within a very secure place within the store, or images should be recorded off-site by a suitable management company.

#### **Intruder and panic alarms**

- 3.3.18 The building should be fitted with an intruder alarm that includes sensors on all doors as well as PIR detectors on the shop floor. Panic alarms should also be considered with panic buttons fitted at till points and in the manager's office.

## **4 Physical Security**

*The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.*

### **4.1 Building Fabric**

- Offices, in which the cash safe will be located, should have solid walls and a secure, rather than a false, ceiling.

### **4.2 Doors**

- Sliding entrance and exit doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+) or a similar security standard.
- Hinged entrance, service doors, and all escape doors should be compliant with, and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. All of these doors should be self-closing and be capable of locking automatically upon closure.
- The door to the management offices (room containing the safe) should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202 or LPS 1175 SR2.
- The doors connecting the shop floor to the staff welfare areas should be solid-core, fitted with an electronic lock operated by a proximity-reader or swipe card. The door should be self-closing and lock automatically upon closure.

### **4.3 Security Shutters**

- All new roller shutters securing loading bays/doors, entrance doors or windows should meet LPS 1175 SR2 standard.

### **4.4 Window Frames**

- Any opening windows should be certificated to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175, include locks operated with a key, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

### **4.5 Glazing**

- All ground level glazing, including any glass in the store management offices that allows views of the shop floor, should incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened.

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## 4.6 Intruder Alarm

- A monitored alarm system should be installed to each unit. Alarms should be linked to contacts on all external doors, windows and shutters, and PIR detectors should monitor all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room. Alarms should have two secure signalling paths (one being GSM radio back-up).
- A panic alarm should be installed, with panic buttons fitted under the till points and in the management offices so that staff can alert other staff members that assistance is required.

## 4.7 Boundaries

- The service yard to the Homebase unit should be enclosed with a 3000mm high, welded wire mesh fence and matching vehicle gates.
- Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points to gates should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates to avoid the creation of footholds. Fencing and gates should be isolated from any other climbing aids, such as lighting columns, bollards, or trees.

## 4.8 Car Park

- Lighting to the car park should be in accordance with BS 5489, with an average lux level 20 and a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated to avoid confusion or conflict, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed.
- Traffic calming measures should be incorporated to limit the speed of vehicles entering and within the site.

## 4.9 Lighting

- Dusk-to-dawn lighting, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors and elevations of the development.
- Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

## 4.10 CCTV

- A CCTV system should be installed within each unit and the retail park system adjusted to reflect the reconfiguration of this part of the site.
- With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- To ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court, procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff/the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available).

**Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

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**Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- Cameras should be placed to monitor general activity around the site and to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be:
  - The car park
  - Cycle and motorcycle parking
  - The customer entrance and exit doors
  - The service yards and service doors
  - All building elevations, with emphasis on monitoring external doors
  - Till points
  - Shop floor aisles
  - Staff-only corridors and staff rooms
  - Management offices

#### 4.11 Landscaping

- The Lidl store entrance doors should be protected by anti-ram bollards.
- In order to promote natural and electronic surveillance of the site, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground.

#### 4.12 Other

- Shopping trolleys should be secured at night/when the store is closed to prevent theft/abuse.
- 'Sheffield' style cycle stands should be installed.
- A secure refuse store should be provided at the rear of the Lidl store.

### 5 Management & Maintenance

- A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
  - Graffiti and litter removal from the immediate environment around the development
  - Repair to lighting, signage, access controls, alarms and CCTV.

### 6 Construction

- The developer should take appropriate measures to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in and out.
- The contractor on this scheme should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme'.
- Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority, SIA, approved (see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

### 7 Secured by Design (SBD)

- Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications

and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

## A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
30.07.19	Joseph Romero, Rapleys	Request for Crime Impact Statement
12.09.19		Site visit
09.10.19	Joseph Romero, Rapleys	Report Issued

## B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and information:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
14366-99	Location Plan	12/18	C
14366-100	Existing Site Plan	12/18	B
14366-105	Proposed Site Plan	12/18	C
14366-106	Proposed GA Plan Ground	12/18	B
14366-107	Proposed GA Plan First	12/18	B
14366-108	Proposed Roof Plan	July 18	B
14366-109	Proposed Elevations	July 18	C
14366-110	Crime Prevention Plan	04/19	A

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent changes to the scheme, it may be necessary for Design for Security to review the recommendations made within this report.

## C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

## D Glossary

### Burglary Resistance Standards

#### BS 7950, 1997

##### **Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.**

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

#### BS PAS 23-1, 1999

##### **General performance requirements for door assemblies.**

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

#### BS PAS 24-1, 2012

##### **General security performance requirements for door assemblies.**

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

#### ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

##### **Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification**

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing
- b) Performance of hardware
- c) Resistance to static loading
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

#### LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

##### **Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components**

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

#### STS01 Issue 4: 2012

##### **Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24**

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

#### STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS202 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

#### EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

##### **Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.**

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

### Commonly Used Acronyms

#### CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

#### CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (Learn more at [www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted](http://www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted))

#### CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

#### INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

#### PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

#### LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

#### UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

### Useful Websites

#### Design for Security

[www.designforsecurity.org](http://www.designforsecurity.org)

#### Secured by Design

[www.securedbydesign.com](http://www.securedbydesign.com)

#### RIBA Product Selector

[www.ribaproductselector.com](http://www.ribaproductselector.com)

#### LPCB – Red Book Live

[www.redbooklive.com](http://www.redbooklive.com)

#### Crime Reduction (Home Office)

[www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk](http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk)

#### DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

[www.designagainstcrime.org](http://www.designagainstcrime.org)

#### Building for Life

[www.buildingforlife.org](http://www.buildingforlife.org)

#### CLG (Communities and Local Government)

[www.communities.gov.uk](http://www.communities.gov.uk)