

## CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT: PRELIMINARY

Thorley Lane, Timperly

116 No. Houses

FOR: Harlex (RLP Timperley) LLP

VERSION A: 8<sup>th</sup> June 2021

REFERENCE: 2016/0760/CIS/03

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

## THORLEY LANE, TIMPERLY

2016/0760/CIS/03

### The 'Crime Impact Statement: Preliminary' Explained


The 'Crime Impact Statement: Preliminary' has been created to accompany outline planning applications where layout is not considered (i.e. the proposal is only at the 'red line' stage). This part of the process will provide your design team with the contextual crime information, and site-specific design considerations needed to develop the layout and appearance of the proposal.

### Reserved Matters Applications

Reserved matters applications, where layout is to be considered, will require a full Crime Impact Statement, which will appraise the design and layout of the developed proposals. Please contact us when work commences on the layout of the scheme for us to develop your preliminary report into a full Crime Impact Statement.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The proposal is an outline application for a development of approximately 116 no.dwellings on the land adjacent to Thorley Lane, Timperley. The local area is typically residential - particularly to the North and the site is suitable for a residential development. The rate of residential burglary in the local area is higher than the average for Trafford and Greater Manchester therefore it is important that measures to reduce the risk of crime are incorporated into the design of the development. A number of recommendations are made in section 3 of this report, to reduce the potential for crime and anti-social behaviour, and these should be considered when more detailed plans are drawn up.



Patrick Babb

**Consultant**



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
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# 1 Visual Audit

The proposed development can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the area of Timperley, within the borough of Trafford.

The site is currently developed and occupied by World of Water Aquatic Centre - a pond & aquarium retailer. The site is roughly bound by Wood Lane to the North, to the East by Thorley Lane and the side/rear boundaries of properties on Wood Lane, to the South by Timperley Brook, and to the West by Green Lane.

The site is not densely developed at present; there are a number of buildings associated with the existing development, car parking areas, and green space. There are two vehicular access points, taken from Wood Lane and Thorley Lane.



## 2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

The following information has been produced to give an insight into the types and volume of, crime experienced across Greater Manchester and Oldham. Particular attention is paid to the area surrounding the site and to crimes which research shows can be affected by the built environment. All data is based on crimes recorded between 2018 and 2019.

### 2.1 Crime Overview

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
13	6	<5	12	7	<5	<5	9	<5	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is 12% lower than the rate of crime Trafford Division with the highest recorded crimes being less serious woundings and domestic burglary. The proposed site is located within an area where there are large areas of undeveloped land; in these areas there is often less foot fall therefore less opportunity for crime. The majority of offences have occurred at the local educational facility located to the south of the site, along Thorley Lane and to the east and west, along Wood Lane and Clay Lane. These roads are the main arterial routes within the area. The violent offences which have occurred in the area have mostly involved incidents between students and domestic disputes. Domestic burglary in the area has largely taken place to the west of the proposed site where a housing estate is located.

### 2.2 Common Local/Use Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure windows and doors (mostly to the rear of the property) using bodily pressure and implements (mostly metal bars) in order to gain entry to the property.

*Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (i.e. PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All private spaces to the sides/rears of the dwellings should be robustly enclosed, particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access. Lighting can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime*

- 2.2.2 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors (mostly to the front of the property).

*Possible Solution - Front doors should have split spindles or a fixed external handle so then cannot be opened from outside without a key. Rear doors should be positioned in secure rear gardens with appropriate boundary treatments. Ground floor windows should have restrictors installed so that they cannot be opened from the outside if left insecure.*

- 2.2.3 Breaking glazing in windows and doors (mostly to the rear of the property), using implements.

*Possible Solution – Glazing at ground floor and easily accessible levels should include a laminate pane to a minimum thickness of 6.4mm or rated as P1A under BS EN 356.*

- 2.2.4 Entering the rear garden of the property and using bodily pressure and implements gain entry to the garden shed

*Possible Solution – Rear boundaries should be of an appropriate height for the location to deter climbing and robust to prevent panels from being damaged or removed. Sheds should be robust and secured with a deadlock or a security rate padlock.*

### 2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages

- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces

## 2.4 Crime Rate Comparison

*The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2018.*

- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **38% higher** than Trafford as a whole, **21% higher** than Greater Manchester and **73% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **39% lower** than Trafford as a whole, **55% lower** than Greater Manchester and **52% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **75% lower** than Trafford as a whole, **83% lower** than Greater Manchester and **75% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **27% higher** than Trafford as a whole, **19% lower** than Greater Manchester and **41% higher** than England & Wales.

## 2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

*The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.*

- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Tuesday during the early hours of the morning (12am - 5am). Offenders often target properties in the early hours of the morning when it is dark and there is less foot fall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.
- 2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:
  - Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure - forcing locks, and implements- mostly crow bars.
  - Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements such as rocks and flower pots.
  - Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.
  - Entering the rear garden of the property by means of climbing gates or removing fence panels and using bodily pressure and implements gain access to the garden shed/ garage.

## 2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

*The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.*

- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Wednesday during the evening (6pm - 9pm). Offenders often target vehicles using on street parking in residential areas, as they are often parked out of sight of the vehicle owner for long periods of time, giving offenders the perception that they are unlikely to be identified.



## 3 Layout Appraisal

### 3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposals seek to erect a residential development, with a mixture of houses and apartments, with associated parking and landscaping.

### 3.2 Indicative Layout Appraisal

- 3.2.1 Driveway parking should be provided at the front of the dwelling where it can be overlooked by residents from a habitable room. Parking to the rear of dwellings should be avoided as it can allow criminals to target vehicles without being easily seen.
- 3.2.2 The proposed development has two vehicular entrances and it is not excessively permeable. The access roads serve different areas of the development but do create a through route. The access road through the development is relatively convoluted which should not make it desirable as a shortcut from Wood Lane to Thorley Lane.
- 3.2.3 Footpaths can often leave developments excessively permeable and this can generate criminal and antisocial behaviour. The footpath routes should not pass too closely to the proposed dwellings, to prevent the footpaths being utilised by criminals to target the buildings. The footpaths should be illuminated to deter congregation/loitering and allow pedestrians to view any potential threats. The footpaths should be wide enough to reduce the potential for pedestrians to pass each other with plenty of space.
- 3.2.4 Where there is a shared passageway between houses, to access the rear garden, it is highly recommended that these are gated as close to the front of the properties as possible. The gate should be robust and a minimum of 1800mm in height, with a shared padlock or key operated deadlock. If a stable and hasp is used it should be positioned on the mid-rail where it is out of reach from the outer face of the gate.
- 3.2.5 Where rear boundaries abut a public footpath the boundary fence should be protected with a strip of defensible planting.

### 3.3 Recommendations

- 3.3.1 Vehicular access into the site for residents should be taken from the most suitable location. Vehicular access points should not be positioned where they could potentially cause unnecessary congestion to the detriment of existing residents, as this could give rise to conflict
- 3.3.2 It is highly recommended that vehicle and pedestrian access/egress is limited to discourage anyone without a purpose from entering the development, leaving potential criminals feeling more vulnerable to detection and making crime less likely to occur.
- 3.3.3 The sides (including gables up to or as close as possible to the front building line) and rears of dwellings should be defined as private space and adequately secured to prevent unauthorised access and particularly robustly where adjacent to any publicly accessible space. It is also highly recommended that dense/mature defensive planting is used on the public side of any such accessible rear boundaries, to discourage unauthorised access and damage. The front elevations of dwellings should be protected by defensible space, clearly defined as separate from the adjacent public highways, in ownership/control of the residents themselves.
- 'When it is unclear whether space is public or private it is difficult to determine what is acceptable behaviour. Where private space is easily accessible to people who have no right to be there and when a place feels like it is not under the supervision of local residents; an offender's presence in the area will not attract attention and is therefore unlikely to be challenged. This can be facilitated by clarity in where public space ends and where communal, semi-private or private space begins. Uncertainty of ownership can reduce responsibility and increase the likelihood of crime and anti-social behaviour going unchallenged'.*  
**'Safer Places - The Planning System and Crime Prevention', Home Office & ODPM, 2004**
- 3.3.4 It is essential that the development is designed so that residents vehicles are secured and overlooked. All dwellings should either have the provision to garage vehicles or have in-curtilage gated car parking arrangements, well-overlooked from habitable room windows. If any driveways/garages are provided to the rear of individual properties, where vehicles would be hidden from view from the residents themselves, they should be incorporated into the rear gardens of the dwellings behind high fencing/vehicular gates.

- 3.3.5 Back gardens should be designed to lock into each other, thus minimising the length of rear boundary adjoining public / communal areas. Front and rear garden areas should be divided with 1.8m high fencing and/or gates.
- 3.3.6 Ideally, communal passageways to serve the rears of properties should be avoided. Where communal passageways must be provided they should be gated as close to the entrance of the passageway as possible, gates should be self-closing, self-locking, and ideally of a robust (steel railing) construction.
- 3.3.7 The dwellings should front onto the existing/proposed streets in order to create 'active frontages' and maximise surveillance over visitors and external spaces. Where houses may front on to non-residential streets creation of natural surveillance opportunities should be carefully considered.
- 3.3.8 The proposed dwellings should have habitable room windows to their front elevations at ground floor level and their design should be kept simple, front doors should not be recessed or behind building lines, where they would be vulnerable to attack.
- 3.3.9 Physical protection measures should be incorporated into the construction of the dwellings in order to make it harder for an offender to commit a crime and raise the risk of detection.
- 3.3.10 A successful lighting scheme deters and reveals potential intruders and reduces the fear of crime. Lighting levels should be good, and evenly distributed. Lighting should be provided to all roads/footpaths (to adoptable standards - including to private drives), parking areas and to the front/rear of all dwellings.
- 3.3.11 Any existing or proposed landscaping features (hard or soft) within the public realm, in front of dwellings or around parking areas should not impede natural surveillance of/from the buildings/spaces or create climbing aids over any boundaries. Future soft landscaping growth and maintenance must be taken into account at the design stage. The layout of the development should not include areas of ambiguous accessible space without apparent ownership or function.

## 4 Useful References

### 4.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. The latest SBD guidance relating to new residential developments can be found at <http://www.securedbydesign.com/industry-advice-and-guides/>.



## A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
10/05/2021	Joshua Ambrus	CIS application received

## B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
MP_L(01)101	Proposed Outline Masterplan	19/03/21	P7

## C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		